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Abstract In this paper, we prove the existence of the equilibrium in choice
for games in choice form. These games have recently been introduced by A.
Stefanescu, M. Ferrara and M. V. Stefanescu. Our results link the recent
research to the older approaches, regarding games in normal form or quali-
tative games.
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1 Introduction
It has been widely agreed upon the fact that Nash’s concept of equilibrium
reflects the possibility of challenging the choices of the unilateral acts of the
players involved in noncooperative games. Having the aim of gaining the
most they can do, the players are in the situation of making choices in a
process described, mathematically, by the notion of ”game” (this was pro-
posed by Nash, and it was initially called ”game in normal form”). The orig-
inal definitions of Nash [4],[5] have been extended, but the derived notions
of qualitative game or abstract economy and their corresponding concepts
of equilibrium reflect the initial meaning of flexible elections in any given
context to permit the players not to deviate, once they agreed on the best
solution for them.
The new extension of a game, called ”the game in choice form”, is due
to Stefanescu, Ferrara and Stefanescu [9]. The game in choice form is a
family of the sets of individual strategies and choice profiles. The authors
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also defined the concept of equilibrium in choice for this type of game. Their
interpretations evolved along with the problem of noncooperative solutions
of the voting operators. Firstly, Stefanescu and Ferrara proposed the concept
of Nash equilibrium in choice in [8] and they renamed it in [9], founding
conditions under which the equilibrium in choice exists. The new adopted
definitions are coherent with the old underlying formalism. For instance,
when the utility functions represent the players’ options, a choice profile can
be seen as the family of players’ graphs best reply mappings. In this case,
the set of equilibria in choice coincides with the set of Nash equilibria. The
generality of the new concepts raise the interest of the formalist theorist of
games, which explicitly can show their significance. The authors themselves
developed these ideas in their work. They referred to the fact that the
players’ preferences need not be explicitly represented, at the same time
considering the possibility of recuperating the known solutions as particular
cases. The second problem raised is the one of the nonexistence of a best
reply. This interest is obviously at the core of our original research. In this
paper, we are looking for new conditions, in order to obtain the existence
of the equilibrium in choice. Our assumptions are different from the ones
proposed when the new theory was framed. They concern the properties of
the sets of choice profiles. We are now exploring a method of proof based on
continuous selection and fixed point theorems for correspondences defined
by using the upper sections of the sets which form the game.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, some no-
tation, terminological convention, basic definition and results about corre-
spondences and games in choice form are given. Section 3 contains existence
results for equlibrium in choice.
2 Preliminaries and notation
Throughout this paper, we shall use the following notations and definitions:
Let A be a subset of a vector space X , 2A denotes the family of all
subsets of A and coA denotes the convex hull of A. If A is a subset of a
topological space X, clA denotes the closure of A in X . If T , G : X → 2Y
are correspondences, then coG and G ∩ T : X → 2Y are correspondences
defined by (coG)(x) :=coG(x) and (G ∩ T )(x) := G(x) ∩ T (x), for each
x ∈ X , respectively.
Given a correspondence T : X → 2Y , for each x ∈ X, the set T (x) is
called the upper section of T at x. For each y ∈ Y, the set T−1(y) := {x ∈
X : y ∈ T (x)} is called the lower section of T at y. The correspondence
T−1 : Y → 2X , defined by T−1(y) = {x ∈ X : y ∈ T (x)} for y ∈ Y , is called
the (lower) inverse of T.
Let X , Y be topological spaces. The correspondence T : X → 2Y is
called lower semicontinuous if for each x∈ X and for each open set V in Y
with T (x) ∩ V 6= ∅, there exists an open neighborhood U of x in X so that
T (y) ∩ V 6= ∅ for each y ∈ U .
Existence of the equilibrium in choice 3
The following lemma will be useful to our study of existence of equilib-
rium in choice.
Lemma 1 (see Yuan [15]). Let X and Y be two topological spaces and let
W be an open (resp. closed) subset of X. Suppose T1 : X → 2Y , T2 : X →
2Y are upper semicontinuous (resp. lower semicontinuous) correspondences
such that T2(x) ⊂ T1(x) for all x ∈ W. Then the correspondence T : X → 2Y
defined by
T (x ) =
{
T1(x), if x /∈W ,
T2(x), if x ∈ W
is also upper semicontinuous (resp. lower semicontinuous).
Further, we present the main models of noncooperative games we will
deal with in this paper. The corresponding notions of equilibrium are also
recalled.
Let (Xi)i∈N be the family of the individual sets of strategies and let
X =
∏
i∈I Xi.
The normal form of an n-person game is (Xi, ri)i∈N , where, for each
i ∈ N , Xi is a nonempty set (the set of individual strategies of player i) and
ri is the preference relation on X of player i. The individual preferences ri
are often represented by utility functions, i.e. for each i ∈ N there exists a
real valued function ui : X → R (called the utility function of i), such that:
xriy ⇔ ui(x) ≥ ui(y), ∀x, y ∈ X. Then the normal form of n-person game
is (Xi, ui)i∈N .
We denote x−i = (x1, ..., xi−1, xi+1, ..., xn),X−i =
∏
i6=j Xi and (x−i, Xi) =
{(x−i, xi) : xi ∈ Xi}.
The Nash equilibrium for the game (Xi, ui)i∈N is a point x
∗ ∈ X which
satisfies for each i ∈ N : ui(x∗) ≥ ui(x∗−i, xi) for each xi ∈ Xi.
For each i ∈ N, the player’s i’s best reply mapping is the correspondence
Bi : X−i → 2Xi , defined by Bi(x−i) = {xi ∈ Xi : ui(x−i, xi) ≥ ui(x−i, yi)
for each yi ∈ Xi}. Then, x∗ ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium if only if x∗ ∈⋂
i∈NGr(Bi).
The element x∗ ∈ X is called weak Nash equilibrium (Stefanescu, Fer-
rara, Stefanescu [9]):
ui(x
∗) ≥ ui(x∗−i, xi) for each xi ∈ Xi and i ∈ N such that Bi(x
∗
−i) 6= ∅.
A qualitative game Γ = (Xi, Pi)i∈N is defined as a family of n ordered
triplets (Xi, Pi), where for each i ∈ N : Pi : X → 2Xi is a preference
correspondence. An equilibrium for Γ is a point x∗ ∈ X which satisfies for
each i ∈ N : Pi(x∗) = ∅.A weak equilibrium (Stefanescu, Ferrara, Stefanescu
[9]) of Γ = (Xi, Pi)i∈N is a point x
∗ ∈ X which satisfies Pi(x∗) = ∅ for each
i ∈ N such that {xi ∈ Xi : Pi(x∗−i, xi) = ∅} 6= ∅.
A choice profile (Stefanescu, Ferrara, Stefanescu [9]) is any collection
C := (Ci)i∈N of nonempty subsets of X. A game in choice form is a double
family ((Xi)i∈N , (Ci)i∈N ), where C = (Ci)i∈N is a choice profile.
We denote C(x−i) the upper section through x−i of the set Ci, i.e.,
C(x−i) = {yi ∈ Xi : (x−i, yi) ∈ Ci}.
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We will make the following assumption:
(A) assume that for each x ∈ X, there exists i ∈ N such that Ci(x−i) 6=
∅.
The game strategy x∗ ∈ X is an equilibrium in choice (denoted EC) (A.
Stefanescu, M. Ferrara, V. Stefanescu [9]) if ∀i ∈ N, (x∗−i, Xi) ∩ Ci 6= ∅ ⇒
x∗ ∈ Ci, equivalently, x∗i ∈ Ci(x
∗
−i), for every i ∈ N for which Ci(x
∗
−i) 6= ∅.
The strategy x∗ ∈ X is a strong equilibrium in choice (denoted SEC) if
x∗i ∈
⋂
i∈N Ci.
3 Equilibrium results
This section provides a summary of different theorems concerning the exis-
tence of equilibria in choice for games in choice form. In order to underline
the novelty and the importance of our work, we also must discuss here the
additional benefit of obtaining corollaries which state, under new conditions,
the existence of the weak Nash equilibria for games in normal form, or the
existence of the weak equilibria of qualitative games. To prove our point,
we will use continuous selection theorems or fixed point theorems for the
correspondences that we will form, considering upper sections of the sets
defining the game of the choice form. The advantage we have by doing this,
deserves a great prominence in the assessment of the new assumptions which
characterize the new statements. These results differ very much from the
ones obtained by Stefanescu, Ferrara and Stefanescu in [9] and they link the
recent research to the older approaches, regarding games in normal form or
qualitative games. In order to suggest priorities to the reader, we keep the
relationship between the main theorems and their consequences on particu-
lar games. For a better understanding of the paper, we recall all properties
of the correspondences which will be used and the tools of proofs. Our study
gives a new perspective of unifying of different approaches and results on the
equilibrium concepts and the existence of noncooperative theory of games.
Finally, we note that we obtain the existence of the strong equilibrium in
choice for all situations considered in this section, if we suppose, in addition,
that Ci(x−i) 6= ∅ for each x−i ∈ X−i.
Let X , Y be topological spaces. We recall that the correspondence T :
X → 2Y has the local intersection property if x ∈ X with T (x) 6= ∅ implies
the existence of an open neighborhood V (x) of x such that ∩z∈V (x)T (z) 6= ∅.
To prove Theorem 1, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Wu, Shen, [13]). Let X be a nonempty paracompact subset of a
Hausdorff topological space E and Y be a nonempty subset of a Hausdorff
topological vector space. Let S,T : X → 2Y be correspondence which verify:
a) for each x ∈ X, S(x) 6= ∅ and coS(x) ⊂ T (x) ;
b) S has the local intersection property.
Then, T has a continuous selection.
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Our main result cites conditions which ensure the existence of equilibria
in choice for a game in choice form in the lack of convexity of the upper
sections of the sets Ci. The framework for our general next theorem consists
of Hausdorff topological vector spaces. The proof is based on an argument
that implies the above lemma.
Theorem 1 Let ((Xi)i∈N , (Ci)i∈N ) be a game in choice form. Assume that,
for each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Hausdorff topological
vector space Ei;
b) there exists a nonempty subset Di of Ci such that Wi = {x−i ∈ X−i :
Di(x−i) 6= ∅} is closed and Di(x−i) 6= ∅ if only if Ci(x−i) 6= ∅;
c) if Di(x−i) 6= ∅, there exists an open neighborhood V (x−i) of x−i
such that ∩z
−i∈V (x−i)Di(z−i) 6= ∅;
d) Di(x−i) is convex or empty for each x−i ∈ X−i.
Then, the game admits equilibria in choice.
Proof For each i ∈ N, let us define the correspondences Si, Ti : X−i → 2Xi ,
by
Si(x−i) =
{
co(
⋃
{y
−i:Di(y−i) 6=∅}
Di(y−i)) if x−i /∈ Wi;
Di(x−i) if x−i ∈ Wi
and
Ti(x−i) =
{
co(
⋃
{y
−i:Ci(y−i) 6=∅}
Ci(y−i)) if x−i /∈Wi;
Ci(x−i) if x−i ∈ Wi.
We call Ti the correspondence of the upper sections of the sets Ci.
The correspondence Si has nonempty and convex values and Si(x−i) ⊂
Ti(x−i) for each x−i ∈ X−i.
Assumption c) implies that Si|(X
−i∩Wi) has the local intersection prop-
erty. If x−i ∈C Wi, then, Si(x−i) =co(
⋃
{y
−i:Di(y−i) 6=∅}
Di(x−i)) 6= ∅. Ac-
cording to b), there exists an open neighborhood Vi(x−i) of x−i such that
Di(z−i) = ∅ for each z−i ∈ Vi(x−i). Then, Si(z−i) =co(
⋃
{y
−i:Di(y−i) 6=∅}
Di(y−i))
for each z−i ∈ Vi(x−i) and, ∩z
−i∈Vi(x−i)Si(z−i) =co(
⋃
{y
−i:Di(y−i) 6=∅}
Di(y−i)) 6=
∅. It follows that Si : X−i → 2Xi has the local intersection property.
The Wu-Shen Lemma implies that Ti has a continuous selection fi :
X−i → Xi.
Let f : X → X be defined by f(x) =
∏
i∈N fi(x−i) for each x ∈ X. The
function f is continuous, and, according to the Brouwer fixed point Theo-
rem, there exists x∗ ∈ X such that f(x∗) = x∗. Hence, x∗ ∈
∏
i∈N Ti(x
∗
−i)
and obviously, x∗i ∈ Ti(x
∗
−i) for each i ∈ N. Suppose that (x
∗
−i, Xi)∩Ci 6= ∅,
for some i ∈ N. Then, Ci(x
∗
−i) 6= ∅ and x
∗
i ∈ Ci(x
∗
−i), which implies
x∗ = (x∗−i, x
∗
i ) ∈ Ci.
As a corollary, we obtain sufficient conditions for a game in normal form
to admit weak Nash equilibria. The main assumption is new in literature
and it refers to the existence of a best reply for each player i to the common
strategy of the other players, which lies in open intervals of the product
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space X−i. The meaning is that each player i can remain stable in the
choice of his own best strategy in the situation that the decisions of the
opponents can vary slightly in any manner profitable to themselves.
Corollary 1 Let ((Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be a game in normal form. Assume
that, for each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Hausdorff topological
vector space Ei;
b) the set {x ∈ X : ui(x) ≥ ui(x−i, yi) for each yi ∈ Xi} is nonempty;
c) Wi = {x−i ∈ X−i : Bi(x−i) 6= ∅} is closed ;
d) if Bi(x−i) 6= ∅, there exists an open neighborhood V (x−i) of x−i so
that ∩z
−i∈V (x−i)Bi(z−i) 6= ∅;
e) Bi(x−i) is convex or empty for each x−i ∈ X−i.
Then, the game admits weak Nash equilibria.
The following corollary concerns the existence of the weak equilibria for
qualitative games.
Corollary 2 Let ((Xi)i∈N , (Pi)i∈N ) be a qualitative game. Assume that, for
each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Hausdorff topological
vector space Ei;
b) the set {x ∈ X : Pi(x) = ∅} is nonempty and Wi = {x−i ∈ X−i :
∃xi ∈ Xi such that Pi(x−i, xi) = ∅} is closed ;
c) for each x−i ∈ X−i, if there exists xi ∈ Xi such that Pi(x) = ∅,
then, there exist an open neighborhood V (x−i) of x−i and zi ∈ Xi such
that Pi(z−i, zi) = ∅ for each z−i ∈ Vi(x−i);
d) {xi ∈ Xi : Pi(x−i, xi) = ∅} is convex or empty for each x−i ∈ X−i.
Then, the game admits weak equilibria.
A new approach to the existence of equilibria in choice implies the con-
cept of weakly convex graph for a correspondence, proposed by X. Ding and
Y He in [2]. Firstly, we recall the definition.
Definition 1 (see [2]). Let X be a nonempty convex subset of a topological
vector space E and Y be a nonempty subset of E. The correspondence
T : X −→ 2Y is said to have weakly convex graph (in short, it is a WCG
correspondence) if for each n ∈ N and for each finite set {x1, x2, ..., xn} ⊂
X, there exists yi ∈ T (xi), (i = 1, 2, ..., n), such that
co({(x1, y1), (x2, y2), ..., (xn, yn)}) ⊂Gr(T ).
We note that either the graph Gr(T ) is convex, or
⋂
{T (x) : x ∈ X} 6= ∅,
then T has a weakly convex graph.
It is obvious that a WCG correspondence may have nonempty values
and may not be convex-valued.
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Example 1 T : [0, 2] → [0, 2], T (x) =
{
[0, 12 ] ∪ [
3
2 , 2] if x = 1,
[0, 2− 12x] if x ∈ [0, 2]8{1}
is a
WCG correspondence (since ∩{T (x) : x ∈ [0, 2]} = {0} 6= ∅), but T (1) is
not convex and Gr(T ) is not convex either.
The theorem below is a continuous selection theorem for correspondences
having weakly convex graph.
Lemma 3 (Patriche, [6]). Let Y be a nonempty subset of a topological vec-
tor space E and K be a (n− 1)- dimensional simplex in a topological vector
space F . Let T : K → 2Y be a WCG correspondence. Then, T has a con-
tinuous selection on K.
The following lemma guarantees the existence of a fixed point for a prod-
uct of lower semi-continuous correspondences. It will be useful for proving
our second result on equilibria in choice.
Lemma 4 (Wu, [12]) Let I be an index set. For each i ∈ I, let Xi be
a nonempty convex subset of a Hausdorff locally convex topological vector
space Ei, Di a nonempty compact metrizable subset of Xi and Si, Ti : X →
2Di two correspondences with the following conditions:
(1) for each x ∈ X , clcoSi(x) ⊂ Ti(x) and Si(x) 6= ∅.
(2) Si is lower semi-continuous.
Then, there exists x∗ =
∏
i∈I
x∗i ∈ D =
∏
i∈I
Di such that x
∗
i ∈ Ti(x
∗) for
each i ∈ I.
The assumption that each correspondence of the upper sections of the
sets Ci has a selection which is an WCG correspondence also assures the
existence of the equilibria in choice. The following theorem presents precisely
this.
Theorem 2 Let ((Xi)i∈N , (Ci)i∈N ) be a game in choice form. Assume that,
for each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) Xi is a nonempty convex compact metrizable set in a locally convex
space Ei and Ci is nonempty;
b) for each xi ∈ Xi, Wi = {x−i ∈ X−i : Ci(x−i) 6= ∅} is a (ni − 1)-
dimensional simplex in X ;
c) there exists a WCG correspondence Si :Wi → 2Xi such that Si(x−i) ⊂
Ci(x−i) for each x−i ∈ Wi;
d) Ci(x−i) is convex or empty for each x−i ∈ X−i.
Then, the game admits equilibria in choice.
Proof. Let be i ∈ I. From the assumption (c) and the selection Lemma
3, it follows that there exists a continuous function fi : Wi → Xi so that
for each x−i ∈Wi, fi(x−i) ∈ Si(x−i) ⊂ Ci(x−i).
Let us define the correspondence Ti : X−i → 2Xi , by
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Ti(x−i) :=
{
{fi(x−i)} if x−i ∈Wi;
co(
⋃
{y
−i:Ci(y−i) 6=∅}
Ci(y−i)) if x−i /∈Wi.
We appeal to Lemma 1 to conclude that Ti is lower semicontinuous on
X . Tychonoff’s Theorem implies that X is compact.
According to Wu’s fixed-point Theorem, applied for the correspondences
Si = Ti and Ti : X → 2Xi , there exists x ∗ ∈ X such that for each i ∈ I,
x ∗i ∈ Ti(x
∗). Suppose that (x∗−i, Xi) ∩ Ci 6= ∅, for some i ∈ N. Then,
Ci(x
∗
−i) 6= ∅ and x
∗
i ∈ Ci(x
∗
−i), which implies x
∗ = (x∗−i, x
∗
i ) ∈ Ci.
Remark 1 We can obtain two corollaries to the above theorem, if we replace
assumption c) with:
c’) there exists a correspondence Si : Wi → 2Xi such that Si has a
convex graph and Si(x−i) ⊂ Ci(x−i) for each x−i ∈ Wi;
or
c”) there exists a correspondence Si :Wi → 2Xi with closed values such
that Si has the property that for any finite set {x1−i, x
2
−i, ...x
m
−i} ⊂ X,⋂m
j=1 Si(x
j
−i) 6= ∅ and Si(x−i) ⊂ Ci(x−i) for each x−i ∈Wi;
Proof. In the first case, since a correspondence with a convex graph is a
WCG one, it follows that Si verifies Assumption c) from Theorem 2, then
we can apply this theorem.
In the second case,X is a compact space and for each i ∈ I the closed sets
Si(x−i), x−i ∈ X−i have the finite intersection property, then
⋂
{Si(x−i) :
x−i ∈ X−i} 6= ∅. It follows that Si is a WCG correspondence and the
conclusion comes from Theorem 2.
As in the first case, we obtain the following corollaries concerning the
existence of the weak Nash equilibria for games in normal form and, respec-
tively, of the weak equilibria for qualitative games.
Corollary 3 Let ((Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be a game in normal form. Assume
that, for each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Hausdorff topological
vector space Ei;
b) the set {x ∈ X : ui(x) ≥ ui(x−i, yi) for each yi ∈ Xi} is nonempty;
c) for each xi ∈ Xi, Wi = {x−i ∈ X−i : Bi(x−i) 6= ∅} is a (ni − 1)-
dimensional simplex in X ;
d) there exists a WCG correspondence Si :Wi → 2Xi such that Si(x−i) ⊂
Bi(x−i) for each x−i ∈Wi;
e) Bi(x−i) is convex or empty for each x−i ∈ X−i.
Then, the game admits weak Nash equilibria.
Corollary 4 Let ((Xi)i∈N , (Pi)i∈N ) be a qualitative game. Assume that, for
each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled:
Existence of the equilibrium in choice 9
a) Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Hausdorff topological
vector space Ei;
b) the set {x ∈ X : Pi(x) = ∅} is nonempty;
c) for each xi ∈ Xi, Wi = {x−i ∈ X−i : ∃xi ∈ Xi such that Pi(x−i, xi) =
∅} is a (ni − 1)-dimensional simplex in X ;
d) there exists a WCG correspondence Si :Wi → 2Xi such that Si(x−i) ⊂
{xi ∈ Xi such that Pi(x−i, xi) = ∅} for each x−i ∈ Wi;
e) {xi ∈ Xi : Pi(x−i, xi) = ∅} is convex or empty for each x−i ∈ X−i.
Then, the game admits weak equilibria.
Now, we present a continuous selection lemma on Banach spaces which
was proposed by Yuan [15].
Lemma 5 (see [15]). Let X be a paracompact space, Y be a Banach space
and T : X → 2Y be a lower semicontinuous correspondences with closed
convex values. Let S : X → 2Y be a correspondence whose graph is open
in X × Y such that T (x) ∩ S(x) 6= ∅ for each x ∈ X. Then, there exists a
continuous function f : X → Y such that f(x) ∈co(T (x) ∩ S(x)) for each
x ∈ X.
The previous lemma leads us to the enunciation of Theorem 3, which
gives new conditions under which the equilibria in choice exist.
Theorem 3 Let ((Xi)i∈N , (Ci)i∈N ) be a game in choice form. Assume that,
for each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Banach space Ei;
b) Ci is nonempty and open;
c) the set Wi = {x−i ∈ X−i : Ci(x−i) 6= ∅} is nonempty and open;
d) there exists a lower semicontinuous correspondence Si : Wi → 2Xi
with closed convex values such that Ci(x−i) ∩ Si(x−i) 6= ∅ for each x−i ∈
X−i;
e) Ci(x−i) is convex or empty for each x−i ∈ X−i.
Then, the game admits equilibria in choice.
Proof Let be i ∈ I. From the assumption d) and the above lemma, it follows
that there exists a continuous function fi : Wi → Xi such that fi(x−i) ∈
Ci(x−i) ∩ Si(x−i) for each x−i ∈ Wi.
Let us define the correspondence Ti : X−i → 2
Xi , by
Ti(x−i) :=
{
{fi(x−i)} if x−i ∈Wi;
co(
⋃
{y
−i:Ci(y−i) 6=∅}
Ci(y−i)) if x−i /∈Wi.
We appeal to Lemma 1 to conclude that Ti is upper semicontinuous on
X .
According to Kakutani’s fixed-point Theorem, there exists x ∗ ∈ X such
that for each i ∈ I, x ∗i ∈ Ti(x
∗
−i). Suppose that (x
∗
−i, Xi) ∩ Ci 6= ∅, for
some i ∈ N. Then, Ci(x∗−i) 6= ∅ and x
∗
i = fi(x
∗
−i) ∈ Ci(x
∗
−i), which implies
x∗ = (x∗−i, x
∗
i ) ∈ Ci.
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As corollaries of Theorem 3, we obtain the following results which assume
the lower semicontinuity of the involved correspondences. We note that
these results are different from the old ones obtained in literature so far.
Corollary 5 Let ((Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be a game in normal form. Assume
that, for each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Banach space Ei;
b) the set {x ∈ X : ui(x) ≥ ui(x−i, yi) for each yi ∈ Xi} is nonempty
and open;
c) the set Wi = {x−i ∈ X−i : Bi(x−i) 6= ∅} is nonempty and open;
d) there exists a lower semicontinuous correspondence Si : X−i → 2Xi
with closed convex values such that Si(x−i) ∩ Bi(x−i) 6= ∅ for each x−i ∈
X−i;
e) Bi(x−i) is convex or empty for each x−i ∈ X−i.
Then, the game admits weak Nash equilibria.
Corollary 6 Let ((Xi)i∈N , (Pi)i∈N ) be a qualitative game. Assume that, for
each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Banach space Ei;
b) the set {x ∈ X : Pi(x) = ∅} is nonempty and open;
c) the set Wi = {x−i ∈ X−i : ∃ xi ∈ Xi such that Pi(x−i, xi) = ∅} is
nonempty and open;
d) there exists a lower semicontinuous correspondence Si : Wi → 2Xi
with closed convex values such that Si(x−i)∩{xi ∈ Xi : Pi(x−i, xi) = ∅} 6= ∅
for each x−i ∈ X−i;
e) {xi ∈ Xi : Pi(x−i, xi) = ∅} is convex or empty for each x−i ∈ X−i.
Then, the game admits weak equilibria.
Further, we will prove the existence of the equilibrium in choice under
new conditions. The proof we will provide explicitly relies on lemmas con-
cerning the fixed points for the correspondences we will construct based on
the upper sections of the sets (Ci)i∈N .
First, we recall the following definition.
If X is a nonempty set and Y is a topological space, the correspondence
T : X → 2Y is said to be transfer open-valued [11] if for any (x, y) ∈ X ×Y
with y ∈ T (x), there exists an x′ ∈ X such that y ∈intT (x′).
Further, we present the following useful statement about the transfer
open-valued correspondences (Proposition 1 in [3]).
Lemma 6 Let Y be a nonempty set, X be a topological space and S : X →
2Y be a correspondence. The following assertions are equivalent:
a) S−1 : Y → 2X is transfer open-valued and S has nonempty values;
b) X =
⋃
y∈Y intS
−1(y).
In this context, Ansari and Yao proved in [1] a fixed point result.
Existence of the equilibrium in choice 11
Lemma 7 (Ansari, Yao [1]). Let X be a compact convex subset of a Haus-
dorff topological vector space. Let S : X → 2X be a correspondence with
nonempty convex values. If X = ∪{intXS
−1(y) : y ∈ X} (or, S−1 : Y → 2X
is transfer open-valued), then, S has fixed points.
We will apply the previous lemma in order to prove the existence of the
equilibria in choice for games in choice form.
Theorem 4 Let ((Xi)i∈N , (Ci)i∈N ) be a game in choice form. Assume that,
for each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Hausdorff topological
vector space Ei and Ci is nonempty;
b) X =
⋃
y∈X{intX
⋂
i∈N (
CWi ∪ {x−i ∈ X−i : x−i ∈ Ci(yi)})}, where
Wi = {x−i ∈ X−i : Ci(x−i) 6= ∅};
c) Ci(x−i) is convex or empty for each x−i ∈ X−i.
Then, the game admits equilibria in choice.
Proof For each i ∈ N, let us define the correspondence Ti : X−i → 2Xi , by
Ti(x−i) =
{
co(
⋃
{y
−i:Ci(y−i) 6=∅}
Ci(y−i)) if xi; /∈Wi
Ci(x−i) if x−i ∈Wi.
The correspondence Si has nonempty and convex values.
Let T : X → 2X be defined by T (x) =
∏
i∈N Ti(x−i) for each x ∈ X.
The correspondence S also has nonempty and convex values.
If y ∈ X, then T−1(y) =
⋂
i∈N{x ∈ X : yi ∈ Ti(x−i)} =
⋂
i∈N (
CWi ∪
{x−i ∈ X−i : x−i ∈ Ci(yi)}).
X =
⋃
y∈X intXT
−1(y), according to assumption b).
We can apply the Ansari and Yao Lemma and we obtain that there
exists x∗ ∈ X such that x∗ ∈ T (x∗). Obviously, x∗i ∈ Ti(x
∗
−i) for each
i ∈ N. Suppose that (x∗−i, Xi) ∩Ci 6= ∅, for some i ∈ N. Then, Ci(x
∗
−i) 6= ∅
and x∗i ∈ Ci(x
∗
−i), which implies x
∗ = (x∗−i, x
∗
i ) ∈ Ci.
Remark 2 According to Lemma 7, we can replace condition b) in Theorem
4 with
b’) if xi ∈ Ci(y−i), then, there exists zi ∈ Xi such that y−i ∈intX
−i
{x−i ∈
X−i : zi ∈ Ci(x−i)} and the set Wi = {x−i ∈ X−i : Ci(x−i) 6= ∅} is closed.
A new result involving the equilibria in choice will naturally follow di-
rectly from Theorem 4.
Theorem 5 Let ((Xi)i∈N , (Ci)i∈N ) be a game in choice form. Assume that,
for each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Hausdorff topological
vector space Ei and Ci is nonempty;
b) for each xi ∈ Xi, {x−i ∈ X−i : xi ∈ Ci(x−i)} ∪C Wi is open, where
Wi = {x−i ∈ X−i : Ci(x−i) 6= ∅};
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c) Ci(x−i) is convex or empty for each x−i ∈ X−i.
Then, the game admits equilibria in choice.
Another proof of the above theorem appeals to Yannelis and Prabhakar’
continuous selection lemma [14] applied for the correspondences Ti : X−i →
2Xi defined by
Ti(x−i) =
{
co(
⋃
{y
−i:Ci(y−i) 6=∅}
Ci(y−i)) if x−i /∈Wi;
Ci(x−i) if x−i ∈Wi.
for each i ∈ N.
We present below the lemma.
Lemma 8 (Yannelis and Prabhakar, [14]). Let X be a paracompact Haus-
dorff topological space and Y be a Hausdorff topological vector space. Let
T : X → 2Y be a correspondence with nonempty convex values and for each
y ∈ Y , T−1(y) is open in X. Then, T has a continuous selection that is,
there exists a continuous function f : X → Y so that f(x) ∈ T (x) for each
x ∈ X.
For the proof, we note that for each i ∈ N, the correspondence Ti has
nonempty and convex values and if xi ∈ Xi, then T
−1
i (xi) =
C Wi ∪ {x−i ∈
X−i : xi ∈ Ci(x−i)} is an open set, according to assumption b).
We can apply the Yannelis and Prabhakar Lemma and we obtain that
there exists fi : X−i → Xi, a continuous selection of Ti. Let f : X → X
be defined by f(x) =
∏
i∈N fi(x−i) for each x ∈ X. The function f is
continuous, and, according to the Brouwer fixed point Theorem, there exists
x∗ ∈ X such that f(x∗) = x∗. Hence, x∗ ∈
∏
i∈N Ti(x
∗
−i) and obviously,
x∗i ∈ Ti(x
∗
−i) for each i ∈ N. Suppose that (x
∗
−i, Xi)∩Ci 6= ∅, for some i ∈ N.
Then, Ci(x
∗
−i) 6= ∅ and x
∗
i ∈ Ci(x
∗
−i), which implies x
∗ = (x∗−i, x
∗
i ) ∈ Ci.
Remark 3 If for each xi ∈ Xi, {x−i ∈ X−i : xi ∈ Ci(x−i)} is open, and the
set Wi = {x−i ∈ X−i : Ci(x−i) 6= ∅} is closed, then the above Theorem
holds.
Corollary 7 is mainly obtained by verifying an assumption concerning
the union of all lower sections of the best reply correspondences for a game
in normal form.
Corollary 7 Let ((Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be a game in normal form. Assume
that, for each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Hausdorff topological
vector space Ei;
b) the set {x ∈ X : ui(x) ≥ ui(x−i, yi) for each yi ∈ Xi} is nonempty;
c) X =
⋃
y∈X{intX
⋂
i∈N (
CWi ∪ B
−1
i (yi))}, where Wi = {x−i ∈ X−i :
Bi(x−i) 6= ∅};
d) Bi(x−i) is convex or empty for each x−i ∈ X−i.
Then, the game admits weak Nash equilibria.
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Remark 4 In Corollary 7, condition c) can also be replaces with
c’) the best reply correspondence Bi : X−i → 2Xi is transfer open valued
and the set Wi = {x−i ∈ X−i : Bi(x−i) 6= ∅} is closed .
A new statement can be deduced explicitly from Corollary 7.
Corollary 8 Let ((Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be a game in normal form. Assume
that, for each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Hausdorff topological
vector space Ei;
b) the set {x ∈ X : ui(x) ≥ ui(x−i, yi) for each yi ∈ Xi} is nonempty;
c) B−1i (xi) ∪ {x−i ∈ X−i : Bi(x−i) = ∅} is open for each xi ∈ Xi;
d) Bi(x−i) is convex or empty for each x−i ∈ X−i.
Then, the game admits weak Nash equilibria.
The following results refer to the existence of weak equilibria for the
qualitative games. They are consequences of Theorem 5.
Corollary 9 Let ((Xi)i∈N , (Pi)i∈N ) be a qualitative game. Assume that, for
each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Hausdorff topological
vector space Ei;
b) the set {x ∈ X : Pi(x) = ∅} is nonempty;
c) X =
⋃
y∈X{intX
⋂
i∈N (
CWi ∪{x−i ∈ X−i : Pi(x−i, yi) = ∅})}, where
Wi = {x−i ∈ X−i : ∃xi ∈ Xi such that Pi(x−i, xi) = ∅};
d) {xi ∈ Xi : Pi(x−i, xi) = ∅} is convex or empty for each x−i ∈ X−i.
Then, the game admits weak equilibria.
Remark 5 In Corollary 9, condition c) can also be replaced with
c”)if Pi(y−i, xi) = ∅, then, there exists zi ∈ Xi such that y−i ∈intY
−i
{x−i ∈
X−i : Pi(x−i, zi) = ∅} and the set Wi = {x−i ∈ X−i : ∃xi ∈ Xi such that
Pi(x−i, xi) = ∅} is open.
Corollary 10 Let ((Xi)i∈N , (Pi)i∈N ) be a qualitative game. Assume that,
for each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Hausdorff topological
vector space Ei;
b) the set {x ∈ X : Pi(x) = ∅} is nonempty;
c) {x−i ∈ X−i : ∄xi ∈ Xi such that Pi(x−i, xi) = ∅} ∪ {x−i ∈ X−i :
Pi(x−i, xi) = ∅} is open for each xi ∈ Xi;
d) {xi ∈ Xi : Pi(x−i, xi) = ∅} is convex or empty for each x−i ∈ X−i.
Then, the game admits weak equilibria.
A very great importance in the fixed point theory has Tarafdar’s fixed
point Theorem, which we present below.
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Lemma 9 (Tarafdar, [10]). Let {Xi}i∈I be a family of nonempty compact
convex sets, each in a topological vector space Ei, where I is an index set.
Let X =
∏
i∈I
Xi. For each i ∈ I, let Si : X → 2
Xi be a correspondence such
that
a) for each x ∈ X, Si(x) is a nonempty, convex subset of Xi;
b) for each xi ∈ Xi, S
−1
i (xi) contains a relatively open subset Oxi of X
such that
∪xi∈XiOxi = X (Oxi may be empty for some xi).
Then, there exists a point x ∈ X such that x ∈ S(x) =
∏
i∈I
Si(x), that
is, xi ∈ Si(x) for each i ∈ I, where xi is the projection of x onto Xi for
each i ∈ I.
By using Lemma 9, we establish Theorem 6, which is a slightly different
version of Theorem 4.
Theorem 6 Let ((Xi)i∈N , (Ci)i∈N ) be a game in choice form. Assume that,
for each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Hausdorff topological
vector space Ei and Ci is nonempty;
b) for each xi ∈ Xi, {x−i ∈ X−i : xi ∈ Ci(x−i)} contains a relatively
open subset Oxi of X−i, such that
∪xi∈XiOxi = X−i (Oxi may be empty for some xi);
c) Ci(x−i) is convex or empty for each x−i ∈ X−i.
Then, the game admits equilibria in choice.
Proof For each i ∈ N, let us define the correspondence Ti : X−i → 2Xi , by
Ti(x−i) =
{
co(
⋃
{y
−i:Ci(y−i) 6=∅}
Ci(y−i)) if x−i /∈Wi;
Ci(x−i) if x−i ∈Wi,
, where Wi =
{x−i ∈ X−i : Ci(x−i) 6= ∅}.
The correspondence Ti has nonempty and convex values.
If xi ∈ Xi, then T
−1
i (xi) =
C Wi ∪ {x−i ∈ X−i : xi ∈ Ci(x−i)}.
According to assumption b), for each xi ∈ Xi, T
−1
i (xi) contains a rela-
tively open subset Oxi of X such that
∪xi∈XiOxi = X−i (Oxi may be empty for some xi). Then,X = ∪xi∈Xi(Oxi×
Xi). For each i ∈ N, let us define the correspondence Si : X → 2Xi , by
Si(x) = Ti(x−i). If xi ∈ Xi, then S
−1
i (xi) = T
−1
i (xi) × Xi. We denote
Uxi = Oxi × Xi and we obtain that for each xi ∈ Xi, S
−1
i (xi) contains
a relatively open subset Uxi of X such that ∪xi∈XiUxi = X (Uxi may be
empty for some xi).
We can apply the previous lemma and we obtain that there exists x∗ ∈ X
such that x∗i ∈ Si(x
∗) = Ti(x
∗
−i) for each i ∈ N. Suppose that (x
∗
−i, Xi) ∩
Ci 6= ∅, for some i ∈ N. Then, Ci(x∗−i) 6= ∅ and x
∗
i ∈ Ci(x
∗
−i), which implies
x∗ = (x∗−i, x
∗
i ) ∈ Ci.
Now, we get the following corollaries from the previous result.
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Corollary 11 Let ((Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be a game in normal form. Assume
that, for each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Hausdorff topological
vector space Ei;
b) the set {x ∈ X : ui(x) ≥ ui(x−i, yi) for each yi ∈ Xi} is nonempty;
c) for each xi ∈ Xi, B
−1
i (xi) contains a relatively open subset Oxi of X
such that
∪xi∈XiOxi = X−i (Oxi may be empty for some xi);
d) Bi(x−i) = {xi ∈ Xi : ui(x) ≥ ui(x−i, yi) for each yi ∈ Xi} is convex
or empty for each x−i ∈ X−i.
Then, the game admits weak Nash equilibria.
Corollary 12 Let ((Xi)i∈N , (Pi)i∈N ) be a qualitative game. Assume that,
for each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Hausdorff topological
vector space Ei;
b) the set {x ∈ X : Pi(x) = ∅} is nonempty;
c) for each xi ∈ Xi, {x−i ∈ X−i : Pi(x−i, xi) = ∅} contains a relatively
open subset Oxi of X such that
∪xi∈XiOxi = X−i (Oxi may be empty for some xi);
d) {xi ∈ Xi : Pi(x−i, xi) = ∅} is convex or empty for each x−i ∈ X−i.
Then, the game admits weak equilibria.
Remark 6 In a particular case, we can weaken condition b) of Theorem 6
by condition b’):
b’) for each xi ∈ Xi, {x−i ∈ X−i : xi ∈ Ci(x−i)} = Oxi is an open
subset of X such that
∪xi∈XiOxi = X−i (Oxi may be empty for some xi). According to Lemma
7, this condition is equivalent with the fact that the correspondence T−1i :
Xi → 2
X
−i is transfer open-valued and Ti has nonempty values, where
Ti : X−i → 2Xi is defined by Ti(x−i) = Ci(x−i) for each x−i ∈ X−i.
In this case, we obtain the following theorem concerning the existence
of the strong equilibrium in choice.
Theorem 7 Let ((Xi)i∈N , (Ci)i∈N ) be a game in choice form. Assume that,
for each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Hausdorff topological
vector space Ei and Ci is nonempty;
b) for each xi ∈ Xi, {x−i ∈ X−i : xi ∈ Ci(x−i)} = Oxi is an open subset
of X such that
∪xi∈XiOxi = X−i (Oxi may be empty for some xi);
c) Ci(x−i) is convex or empty for each x−i ∈ X−i.
Then, the game admits strong equilibria in choice.
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4 Concluding remarks
Our study is a new perspective unifying different approaches and results
on the equilibrium concepts and the existence of noncooperative theory of
games. We have proposed to the reader a synthesis of theorems and conse-
quences which state, under new conditions, the existence of the equilibrium
for games in choice form, in normal form and also for qualitative games.
Our approach differs essentially from the one of Stefanescu, Ferrara and
Stefanescu, who proposed the new concept of game in choice form and the
corresponding equilibrium in choice (2012). A further research may consist
of the integration of all research instruments and perspectives. The advan-
tage of using these new ideas is that they are more systematic and can
cover more general situations. This paper reflects the integrity of this kind
of thinking and can reopen the problem of the equilibrium existence under
new conditions.
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